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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate governance can reduce or even eliminate the extent of earnings management. 
Normally, an institutional environment that provides better legal protection can control managers’ 
self-interest to a certain extent. Takeover force can exert market pressure on managers to do the 
best for shareholders. Prior studies have investigated different corporate governance mechanisms 
that can have negative relationships with earnings management. Board independence can enhance 
certain monitoring behaviors in managers, including the misappropriation of assets. Female 
directors can develop trust leadership, which requires managers to share information, and are 
more likely to be risk-averse to frauds and opportunistic earnings management. An audit 
committee can oversee the internal control for financial reporting and the quality of financial 
information. Directors with financial expertise can provide incremental control effects on earnings 
management, especially in firms with weak corporate governance. This paper contributes to 
corporate governance by providing detailed reviews of different corporate governance 
mechanisms, reviewing the latest findings on classification shifting, and summarizing earnings 
management measures, including a new diagnostic system. In the future, this new diagnostic 
system may be investigated in different contexts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
orporate governance continues to be an area of importance while earnings management still appears to 
be a problematic issue. This paper aims to review the extant literature and examine whether the evidence 
supports the view that additional corporate governance and regulatory measures will mitigate earnings 
management. However, this paper does not address the agency theory behind corporate governance mechanisms, as 
reviewed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by providing 
detailed reviews of the various corporate governance mechanisms, reviewing the latest findings on classification 
shifting, and summarizing earnings management measures, including a new diagnostic system. Many studies argue 
that some of the currently used accrual models are questionable; hence, it would be better to review the latest 
findings in earnings management measurements. In the future, this new diagnostic system, as well as Dechow’s 
novel model, may be investigated in different contexts. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 introduces the concept of corporate governance. Section 3 presents various corporate governance mechanisms. 
Section 4 reviews different types of earnings management. Section 5 reviews different measures of earnings 
management. Section 6 discusses the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management and the 
last section concludes this paper. 
 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 Gabrielle O’Donovan defines corporate governance as an internal system encompassing policies, processes, 
and people that serve the needs of shareholders and other stakeholders by directing and controlling management 
C 
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activities with good business practices, objectivity, and integrity. Sound corporate governance is reliant on external 
marketplace commitment and legislation, as well as a healthy board culture that safeguards policies and processes. 
Corporate governance is designed to pursue stakeholders’ interests (e.g., obtaining a reasonable return on capital, 
reducing misappropriation of assets) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance is also a set of mechanisms 
by which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders (La Porta et al., 2002). These 
mechanisms include the various applicable laws, rules, and functions. 
 
 Coffee (1999) observes the distinction between legal and functional convergence. Legal convergence refers 
to the changes in the rules and enforcement mechanisms toward successful standards. Functional convergence refers 
to the market-based changes that bring more firms and assets under the umbrella of effective investor legal 
protection. To improve corporate governance, radical changes are required in legal systems including amendments to 
the securities, company, and bankruptcy laws designed to protect the minority shareholders by increasing the 
disclosure of material information. The company laws enable minority shareholders to act in enforcement of their 
interests.  
 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the subject of corporate governance is practical importance. 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) and Romano (1993) assess the American corporate governance system, and review it 
positively. Prior earlier studies have also discussed replacing the American and UK corporate governance 
mechanisms with those of the German and Japanese systems (Roe, 1993; Charkham, 1994). Barca (1995) and 
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1995) argue that Italian corporations are less developed in terms of corporate 
governance than corporations in developed countries. Some emerging countries do not exhibit any corporate 
governance mechanisms (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995
1
). Alchian (1950) and Stigler (1958) claim that 
improvements in corporate governance are unnecessary, because competition can make firms adopt corporate 
governance to minimize their cost of capital. The above studies on market competition seem to be valid; however, 
this emerging process may need more time. Hence, stakeholders who have already provided capital to firms may 
suffer a loss during this process. These stakeholders also want to ensure the receipt of certain returns from firms.  
 
 Improving corporate governance involves not only market competition but also the imposition of 
regulations. Poor corporate governance allows insiders to secure finance polities and markets (LLSV, 2000). 
Successful corporate governance means that law reforms could hamper the special interests of the insiders. For 
example, in 1933, the US government introduced securities market regulation in order to increase corporate 
disclosure. In 1929, the US experienced a Great Depression in part because of insufficient disclosures about the fair 
values of assets. In addition to the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (Beaudreau, 2005
2
), this factor also 
partially contributed to a capital markets crash in 1929. 
 
 The creation of the agency problem results from the separation of ownership and control. As managers have 
more inside information than the financial providers, these financial providers face agency costs to monitor 
managers’ behavior. The managers might pursue their self-interests to maximize their own wealth, perhaps at the 
expense of other parties’ wealth and interests (Jensen, 1986). The contract setting may not be enough to resolve the 
problem of managers acting in conflict with the interests of financial providers. Furthermore, contracts between 
managers and financial providers may require the managers to disclose accounting information in order for the 
financial providers to monitor their financial providers’ interests and wealth. However, this information is provided 
by the managers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), who may choose to overstate the numbers in the financial 
statements through their accounting estimates and standards.  
 
 Corporate governance would reduce the agency problem
3
 between financial providers and managers and 
increase the efficiency of contracts (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). Even in firms in developed countries, this 
agency problem can be a source of larger costs for shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as 
                                                 
1 They argue that most Russian firms are held by the government and do not have external capital. Therefore, they are weak at 
corporate governance.  
2 He argues that deepening the great depression results from the eventual passage of the tariff act.  
3 Agency problem studies can be traced back to Berle and Means (1932), with further development by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Jensen and Fama (1983). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide empirical evidence of agency costs. 
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sum of the monitoring expenses such as vote in general meetings and litigation cost to sue managers’ wrongdoing by 
shareholders, the bonding expenditures such as disclosure of annual reports and forego powers by managers, and the 
residual loss that generated by delegation of powers to managers. Thus, corporate governance would reduce the 
agency costs of different parties to the firm. In commonwealth countries, the primary ways to protect shareholders, 
including minority shareholders, are the legal system (i.e., corporate laws, SEC rules and regulations, corporate 
bylaws, and charters) and market takeover force. Another way to protect shareholders is through internal corporate 
governance mechanisms including board independence, board composition, audit committee, compensation 
committee and nomination committee. This paper only focuses on the perspective of how corporate governance 
influences earnings management. One of the reasons is that earnings management can influence shareholders by 
using financial information to make decisions. More importantly, earnings management can also affect the 
credibility of financial information, which can lead to major financial scandals (e.g., Enron, World.com), and the 
capital market may crash. Furthermore, it can also help standard-setters from emerging countries protect 
shareholders’ interests by using experience from western countries.  
 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
 
 There are several types of corporate governance mechanisms, such as the Anglo-American, Japanese, and 
German systems. This paper will focus more on the Anglo-American system because the common law system is 
currently regarded to be the most effective corporate governance system. Corporate governance mechanisms can be 
broadly classified into two types: internal and external. While regulators concentrate on internal mechanisms, in 
practice external mechanisms are also important (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). External mechanisms are 
determined by outside factors, aim to govern firms in favor of the interests of stakeholders, and include items such 
as legal protection and takeover rules. Internal mechanisms are decided by internal factors, including insider 
shareholding as well as board structures and characteristics, including the proportion of independent directors, 
director backgrounds, audit committees, remuneration committees, and ownership structures. 
 
3.1 External Corporate Governance 
 
3.1.1 The Legal/Regulatory System 
 
 Shareholders provide capital to firms in exchange for control rights. This creates contractual relationships 
that include charters and bylaws between shareholders and firms (Hart, 1995). Shareholders can seek legal 
remediation from the court if managers violate the contract under common law. Shareholders have different rights 
under corporate laws, such as voting apportionment or removal of directors
4
, approval of executive service 
compensation contracts, and alteration of firm charters and bylaws (Manne, 1965; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1983). 
Management has day-to-day operational control of firms under the law; however, it is subject to statutory 
requirements including qualifications, functions, disclosures, and removal, as well as limitations of power, the duty 
of care, fiduciary duty, and shareholders’ voting rights, as mentioned above. This legal protection can generate high 
costs to shareholders, and frequently requires a certain proportion of shareholders to seek court injunctions against 
certain actions by managers or to take legal action against firms. Normally, firms in common law countries, where 
investor protection is stronger, make higher dividend payouts (Choy, Gul, and Yao, 2011). Countries with better 
investor protection have higher Tobin’s Q ratios (LLSV, 2002). This greater legal protection is associated with lower 
levels of information asymmetry (La Porta et al., 2002; Gul and Qiu, 2012). 
 
 Comparative studies of corporate governance on legal protection have shown that common law countries 
provide the strongest degree of protection for shareholders (Denis, 2010). For instance, Weisbach (1988) provides 
evidence that firms with more outside directors are more likely to remove top managers when firm performance is 
poor
5
. However, shareholders have less relative protection than employees and creditors, as employees are paid for 
their services almost immediately and creditors receive their principal and interest before shareholders when 
liquidation occurs. Hence, shareholders require stronger protection of their interests. There are two main types of 
                                                 
4  There is no requirement for voting a director out. 
5 A different view claims that firms would experience performance disaster before the board acts. For instance, Kaplan (1994) 
and Kaplan and Minton (1994) demonstrate evidence of this in Japan and Germany.  
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protection from laws: duty of care and duty of loyalty
6
 (or fiduciary duty). Fiduciary duty involves controlling self-
dealing
7
 and self-interest of acts or behavior by insiders. Many rules and regulations deal with aspects of both 
elements, including approval of independent directors, subcommittee supervision, disclosure of financial 
information, and compensation approval from shareholders. As the common law system is currently regarded to be 
the most effective corporate governance system, this paper will investigate the rules and regulations that protect 
shareholders under the common law system. According to UK requirements, the board of directors should include a 
certain balance of executive and non-executive directors (particularly independent non-executive directors
8
should be 
independent to meet UK independence criteria from the management team and free from any related business or 
other relationships or circumstances that could affect their judgments, and should have conduct due diligence with a 
positive contribution on the board) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s 
decision making
9
. In the US, listed companies must be required to have a majority of independent directors
10
 in the 
board. NYSE mentions the reason is that requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the quality of 
board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest
11
. This supports the board independence 
can reduce the managers’ self-interest. Hong Kong stock exchange listing rules require every board of directors of a 
listing issuer is required to appoint at least three independent non-executive directors
12
. The rule to strengthen that 
one-third of the directors must be independent and non-executive will change at the end of 2012
13
. 
 
 UK audit committee regulations
14
 require boards to establish an audit committee of at least three directors, 
or two directors in the case of smaller companies, all of whom are independent non-executives and at least one of 
whom has recent and relevant financial experience
15
, should be set out in written terms of reference that deal clearly 
with the committee’s authority and duties16. The members of the committee, a majority of whom should be 
independent non-executive directors, but chairman of the board should not be a member of the committee (for 
smaller companies, the chairman of the board may be a member of the audit committee but not its chair of the 
committee
17
), should be listed in the annual report and financial accounts
18
. In contrast, the US previously required a 
listed company to have an audit committee of independent directors
19
 only; however, the NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
ASE now require three independent directors on the committee, each of whom must be “financially literate.” Hong 
Kong has similar requirements to the UK
20
, although different countries have different rules to control excess 
compensation for top managers. The UK requires that listed companies employ a remuneration committee, 
composed of at least three independent non-executive directors (two for smaller companies
21
), to set compensation. 
In annual meetings, shareholders should also be invited to approve service contracts exceeding two years
22
. Firms 
must disclose annual total compensation with individual remuneration. The US has more relaxed requirements: the 
board can set its own salary, and the US disclosure rule only requires disclosure of the salaries of the top five 
officers
23
. In Hong Kong, Main Board Rule 13.68 and GEM Rule 17.90 requires that service contracts including 
                                                 
6 Duty of care refers to decision-making procedure and quality of decision making. Duty of loyalty requires the director to 
place the interests of the company before personal interests.  
7 To control directors’ inside dealings, the UK requires disclosure of directors’ transactions plus approval within four days 
(LR 9, Model Code nos. 3–11). The US and Hong Kong have similar requirements. 
8 The Combination Code of Corporate Governance A.3.1 & A3.2.   
9
      The Combination Code of Corporate Governance A.3 Main Principal.   
10 NYSE LCM 303A.01. 
11     NYSE manual Section 3: Corporate Responsibility. 
12 SEHK LR Main board rule 3.10(1). It also requires at least one of the independent non-executive directors must have 
appropriate professional qualifications or accounting or related financial management expertise. 
13     Rule 3.10A 
14 UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2010 C3.1. and FRC Guidance on Audit Committees Section 2.3.  
15 Disclosure and Transparency Rules 7.1.1.R.  
16     UK FRC Guidance on Audit Committees Section 2.2. 
17     UK FRC Guidance on Audit Committees Section 2.3. 
18 Combined Code Guidance D.3.1. to D.3.5. No one other than the audit committee’s chairman and members is entitled to be 
present at a meeting of the audit committee. 
19 Under Exchange Act: Rule 10A-3. 
20 SEHK Listing rule 3.22. The audit committee must be chaired by an independent non-executive director (2.23). 
21 UK Corporate Governance Code D2.1 (Financial Reporting Council, 2010).  
22 UK Corporate Governance Code D2.2 and Listing Rules LR 9.4.  
23 SEC 17 CFR PARTS 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249 AND 274. 
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employment contracts exceeding three years for listed companies must be approved by shareholders
24
in the 
meetings, and firms must disclose total salaries under Section 161 of the Companies Ordinance
25
. For disclosure of 
insiders’ information, UK requires firms to disclose to the public as soon as possible; Hong Kong requires an on-
going basis disclosure; the US requires disclosure in the same year through Form 8-K
26
 but it shall not be deemed 
“filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Acts.  
 
 In some cases, the above-mentioned laws restrict certain self-dealing and self-interest actions by managers. 
This can be enforced by the court. The plaintiff suffering from such actions can seek justice from the court. In some 
cases, the court gives the right to firm charters and bylaws to enforce shareholders’ interests (Easterbrook and 
Fischel, 1991). The law delegates power to the majority; however, another agency problem can arise between the 
majority and the minority. Therefore, rules on the disclosure of holdings are imposed on majority shareholders. 
However, as the court does not want to intervene in firm affairs more than is necessary, in some cases, the court 
requires at least 5% of voting rights of shareholders allowed to seek remedies (such as in Thailand, Malaysia, etc) 
(Nam and Nam, 2004). Hence, the legal system can only protect shareholders’ interests to a certain extent. Thus, 
other corporate governance mechanisms are required to control management.  
 
 One such mechanism is the legal protection mentioned above. Another is giving control of the firm to 
blockholders to reduce the agency problem between shareholders and management. Lack of investor protection 
compels company insiders to hold higher fractions of the equity of the firms they manage. Prior studies indicate a 
negative relationship between the degree of legal protection for investors and the amount of equity held by insiders, 
and a positive correlation between inside equity ownership and the marginal return to capital (Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Love, 2004). During the Asian Financial Crisis, firm performance was negatively related to the extent 
of legal protection for investors (Johnson et al., 2000a).  
 
3.1.2 The Takeover Force 
 
 Corporate takeovers have increasingly become a characteristic of the American business culture (Pound, 
1988). Takeover plays an important role in capital reallocation worldwide. When the actual and potential values of a 
firm are sufficiently negative, there is incentive for outside parties to seek control of the firm. Even firms with cost 
inefficiency face a high risk of being taken over (Frydman, Frydman, and Trimbath, 2001
27
). Through takeover, cost 
efficiency can be improved
28
. Changes in the control of firms virtually always occur at a premium (Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). Outsiders can earn a premium for share performance. Prior studies generally show significant ex 
post performance improvement (Healy, Palepu, and Ruback, 1992; Lichtenberg, 1992; Switzer, 1996). Threat of 
takeover can pressurize firm management to maintain a high firm value. Otherwise, the firm could be taken over and 
the management replaced. Weisbach (1993) argues that one of the reasons that hostile takeovers occur is to replace 
managers that are not maximizing shareholder wealth. The potential replacement of managers can provide incentives 
for managers of target firms to keep their firms’ share price as high as possible29. However, Denis and McConnell 
(2003) argue “managers interested in maximizing the size of their business empire can waste corporate resources by 
overpaying for acquisitions rather than returning cash to shareholders”. Prior studies also provide evidence that firm 
size has a negative effect on the risk of takeover (Singh, 1975; Hasbrouck, 1985). Therefore, the threat of takeover 
can compel managers to do better for shareholders’ interests because the firm value is reflected in the share price. 
This may be a good corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholders’ interests.  
 
 
                                                 
24 SEHK views an “employment contract” with a director to contain the terms upon which he is to provide his/her services to 
the firm. So, an employment contract should be subject to the same disclosure and shareholders’ approval requirements. 
25 Cap32 S161 Particulars in accounts of directors' emoluments, pensions, etc. 
26 Form 8-K is a form used for listed firms to notify investors of any material event that is important to shareholders or the US 
SEC. 
27 They measure the ex-post performance of takeovers by cost-per-unit revenue. 
28 There has been a vigorous debate regarding whether or not takeovers improve firm cost efficiency and performance. Prior 
studies have generally taken two approaches: whether the ex-ante performance of firms attracts takeovers, and whether firms 
improve their performance after being taken over.   
29 Mitchell and Lehn (1990) provide empirical evidence on this proposition.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2013 Volume 29, Number 2 
396 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  2013 The Clute Institute 
 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) measure the takeover force as part of a composite governance variable 
(Totgov). They classify corporate governance into internal and external governance. The extent of external 
governance is determined by the level of anti-takeover protection. If firms take stricter anti-takeover measures 
(which may include some defenses such as poison pills, staggered boards), corporate governance in the market is 
lower, and vice versa. If managers of a firm do not perform well, the firm would be X-inefficient and the share price 
of the firm would drop. These takeover defenses may hurt shareholders’ interests if managers use these defenses to 
entrench themselves or benefit personally
30
. This would then attract other firms that are more management-efficient 
to take over at a low price. When the new managers improve the firm, its share price increases. The new managers 
would then gain from this increase. Therefore, the economy’s resources would be kept in the hands of efficient 
managers (Manne, 1965). This would exert pressure on the X-inefficient managers to do better in order to reduce the 
risk of being laid off from a takeover. Thus, a lower anti-takeover level would provide more market control to the 
firm, thereby a higher level of external governance. It appears that overall, takeover corporate governance seems to 
be effective in controlling management self-interests. However, Shivdasani (1993) considers other corporate 
governance mechanisms and finds that corporate governance has a major significant effect on managers’ behavior, 
and that takeovers are a part of the process that eventually reorganizes inefficient organizations. 
 
3.2 Internal Corporate Governance 
 
3.2.1 Board Structures, Composition, and Meetings  
 
 One check on management is provided by the board of directors. In theory, the board is an effective 
corporate governance mechanism. Shareholders elect members of the board to act on their behalf, and the board in 
turn delegates power to top management while still monitoring management performance and ratifying any decision 
that demonstrates a lack of good faith for shareholders. If board members do not do a good job monitoring 
managers’ behavior, shareholders can vote out and replace members of the board. As common law countries are 
regarded as having better corporate governance, this paper focuses on board structures, composition, and meetings 
in these countries. The US is concerned with the size and structure of boards, outside directors, and whether or not 
the CEO and chair positions are held by the same individual. Many prior studies around the world deal with the 
corporate governance measurement of board structure. Considering stock returns, operating performance, and sales 
growth, Kaplan and Minton (1994) show that outside directors can stabilize and modestly improve corporate 
performance. In the UK, Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002) find that CEO turnover increased following the 
issuance of the corporate governance code requiring that different people serve as chairperson and CEO, and that the 
sensitivity of turnover to performance became stronger. In New Zealand, a higher fraction of outside directors leads 
to better performance (Hossain, Prevost, and Rao, 2001). In Spain, the market reacts positively to announcements of 
new corporate governance compliance (Rodriguez and Anson, 2001).  
 
 Composing a board of directors is an important corporate governance mechanism that can control 
managers’ opportunistic behavior and reduce earnings management. Board composition includes determining the 
mix of non-executive (including independent) and executive directors; designating audit, compensation, nominating 
and other committees; determining the mix of qualifications and areas of expertise; and determining the proportion 
of female directors on the board.   
 
 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) also consider internal governance measurements, including the 
percentage of independent directors on the board and the number of board meetings. Independent directors supervise 
the managers in the firm and reduce the misappropriation of assets by the managers at the expense of shareholders’ 
interests. A higher percentage of the independent directors would more efficiently control the managers, providing 
better corporate governance. NYSE
31
 provides the definition for independence. Independent directors are no 
material relationship with the company, shareholder, or office of related organization with the listed company, must 
not be an employee or former employee of listed company during the previous three years, not receive more than 
$120,000 in direct compensation annually from the listed company in any year. Not a partner or employee of the 
                                                 
30 For instance, Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) document that after managers adopt takeover defenses, CEO 
compensation rises. Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999a, 1999b, 2000) find similar results.  
31 NYSE LCM 303A.02 Independence Tests. 
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company’s auditors, not during the past three years an executive officer of another company where an executive 
officer of the listed company has served on the compensation, and not an employee of a company that has received 
payments from or made payments to that listed company greater than $1 million. Other common law countries have 
similar definitions of independence. Adams (2000) claims that, in addition to the board structure, the number of 
board meetings is a good proxy for the ability of corporate governance structures to control manager behavior. The 
board still needs to be effective in enforcement. It is necessary for directors to perform their duties to monitor 
managers’ behavior; otherwise, the managers can still act against the interests of the shareholders. Therefore, the 
number of board meetings is a good proxy for measuring the effectiveness of board performance and internal 
corporate governance.  
 
 Females are becoming increasingly represented on boards. Researchers have recently found evidence of 
increased female board participation. For instance, in the US in 2012, women held only 16.6% of board seats among 
Fortune 500 companies, compared with 16.1%, 15.7%, 15.2%, 15.2% and 14.8% in 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008 and 
2007, respectively (Catalyst, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008 and 2007). In Australia, women held almost 12.3% of 
the board seats of those countries’ ASX200 corporations in 2012, compared with 8.4% and 8.3%, respectively, in 
2010 and 2007. In Canada and the UK, women held almost, 14%, and 9%, respectively, of the board seats of those 
countries’ largest corporations in 2009, compared with 13%, and 8.5%, respectively, in 2007 (Equal Opportunity for 
Women in the Workplace Agency, 2010). Women held almost 8.0%, 8.5%, and 9.7% of the board seats of the top 
300 European corporations in 2004, 2006, and 2008 respectively, compared with 11.7% in 2010 (European 
Professional Women’s Network EPWN, 2010). The highest proportion of women representation in board is Norway 
among EU countries from 2004 to 2010 (more 35% in 2010). Different countries have encouraged or imposed rules 
and regulations to promote the greater participation of women on boards, such as Australia
32
, Canada, India
33
, 
Malaysia and Italy
34. Adams and Ferreia (2009) find that female directors can better monitor managers’ behavior 
through board input, such as board attendance, and are more likely to sit on monitoring-related committees (e.g., 
audit, nominating, and corporate governance), and affect firm governance in terms of chief executive officer 
turnover and compensation. Therefore, female directors can often better improve the earnings quality of firms 
(Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui, 2011), as they tend to have better communication skills, hold more informed discussions, 
and feature better independent thinking, thereby contributing to better monitoring of the managers (Terjesen, Sealy, 
and Singh 2009; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams, Gray, and Nowland, 2010).  
 
3.2.2 Audit Committees  
 
 Audit committees mainly provide independent oversight of internal control effectiveness and the quality of 
the financial reporting and work done by external auditors. Other roles of the audit committee include providing 
assurance that firms are in compliance with pertinent laws and regulations, conducting internal and external affairs 
ethically, maintaining the control mechanisms in an effective way against fraud, and dealing with conflicts of 
interest. The audit committee also provides a communication bridge between the board, external auditors, internal 
auditors, and the relevant authorities. This paper focuses on common law countries as they are regarded to have 
better corporate governance, among these countries the US has stricter regulations on audit committees. 
 
 According to US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
35
, listing rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ, the audit 
committee is set up to enhance the integrity of financial information. SOX 2002 enhances the monitoring role of the 
audit committee within firms. For instance, Section 202 requires audit committee of firm shall preapprove of all 
other services provided by the audited firm, except certain conditions and requires the approval of non-audit services 
by the auditor shall be disclosed in periodic reports. Section 204 increases requirement of timely reports to audit 
committee on critical accounting policies and practices, and all alternation treatments of financial information within 
                                                 
32
    ASX Corporate Governance Code.  
33     India Listing Rules Clause 49. 
34
    Law 120 
35 SOX has had positive effects on the quality of financial reporting. Prior studies show that after SOX was enacted, financial 
statement restatements from firms increased dramatically, from 5.7% in 2003 to 14% in 2005 (Benoit, 2006). Thus, SOX 
seems to be working (See Public Accounting Report: Report Suggests Sox is Working. “Restatement figures climb since 
2003”).  
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GAAP. Section 301 mentions the audit committee is “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of work” of the auditor employed by firm. Subsection (3A) also requires that the committee be composed 
of independent directors only though it provides a definition of “independence”36. Section 302 requires the 
committee to monitor management on internal control effectiveness. However, the US SEC does not require 
members of the committee to have financial expertise,
37
 which is a good way of controlling the self-interest of 
managers (Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau, 2004). Independence of audit committee is critical for firms and 
stakeholders. Before SOX 2002, a CEO could select the members of the audit committee and determine their duties 
and the discussion agenda in committee meetings. However, many frauds have involved senior managers. When the 
committee lacks independence, the problems are not brought to it. Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2007) and Cohen 
et al. (2012) state that an audit committee’s financial expertise can improve financial information quality and 
enhance the credibility of the firm’s financial statement (for other studies related to audit committees with financial 
expertise and information quality, see Bédard et al., 2004 and Krishnan, 2005), as it can provide better accounting 
and financial advice to the board and better monitor internal control systems and the quality of external audit work. 
 
3.2.3 Compensation Committee 
 
 In theory, shareholders should set executive compensation. However, in practice, this authority is delegated 
to the compensation committee. In fact, in 2003, NYSE and NASQAD required listed companies to form a 
compensation committee to perform this task and all members of the committee were required to be independent 
directors
38
. In 2012, they even proposed to prohibit firms to list when not complying with SEC rule regarding 
independence of compensation committee. The main role of the compensation committee is to design executive 
incentives and compensation to attract, maintain, and motivate top executives. The role of these committees is to 
control certain self-interested behaviors of managers, such as providing themselves with overly generous 
compensation. The kind of compensation packages most likely to alleviate moral hazard involves a combination of 
base salaries, bonuses, restricted shares, warrants, and stock options. The US SEC requires that the compensation 
contracts of top executives of listed companies be approved or recommended by the board by a majority of 
independent directors. Apart from setting compensation for top executives, the committee also has oversight on the 
design and operation of retirement plans. Such committee has fiduciary duties to shareholders for ensuring both 
fairness and motivation of compensation for top executives. The compensation committees of large firms usually 
hire external consultants to provide industry-wide compensation data or benchmarking so it can set competitive 
compensation for top executives. Recently, there has been frequent criticism regarding the excessive compensation 
awarded to top executives, the committee seems losing control of the size of executive compensation, and the 
weakening relationship between the level of executive compensation and firm performance.  
 
3.2.4 Ownership Structure 
 
 When the owners are also the managers of a firm (the alignment effect), the overlap between ownership and 
control could lead to a reduction in conflicts of interest (agency problem) and, therefore, higher firm value. When 
managers are not owners, they may have greater freedom to pursue their own objectives, reducing firm value (the 
entrenchment effect). Holderness (2002) indicates that the relationship between blockholders and firm performance 
in the US is sometimes negative, sometimes positive, and never very pronounced. In Germany, firm performance is 
positively related to concentrated equity ownership, and the positive relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm value is particularly strong where there is block ownership by banks (Franks and Mayer, 2001). Claessens 
et al. (1998) find that board ownership by corporations is negatively related to performance. Short and Keasey 
(1999) find that in the UK, entrenchment effects dominate alignment effects after board ownership exceeds 12%. 
Craswell, Taylor, and Saywell (1997) find a weak curvilinear relation between inside ownership and performance in 
Australia. Chen and Ho (2000) document that diversification ownership has a negative effect on firm value. Morck, 
Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) demonstrate that the relationship is more positive when institutional ownership 
                                                 
36 Members may not be compensated for anything other than service on the board and accept consulting, advisory, or other 
Compensatory fee from the firm. 
37 SOX Section 407 only requires US firms to disclose whether an audit committee includes financial expertise. It also imposes 
a limited definition of financial expertise as, under huge pressure from corporations, it has relaxed its definition. 
38      Section 16(b) of Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.  
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(held by banks) is high. Xu and Wang (1997) find that this relation is stronger when blockholders are financial 
institutions than when blockholders are corporations. 
 
 Regarding diversified holdings by shareholders, a large number of public shareholders holding large shares 
of the firm pressurize the management of the firm to act in the shareholders’ interests since they have more power to 
lay off inefficient managers. More importantly, the public shareholders would require the disclosure of much more 
information regarding the firm to the public. Thus, a firm held by large public shareholders would be efficient at 
controlling the managers of the firm. Leech and Leahy (1991) provide evidence for this in the UK based on 
corporate governance and the percentage of holdings from public shareholders. Regarding ownership concentration, 
Berle and Means (1932) find that if no single shareholder has over 20% of shares, the public shareholders can exert 
effective control over a firm
39
.  
 
 However, Hart (1995) argues that dispersed ownership of large public firms creates the problem in that 
small holding shareholders are too small to exercise control over the day-to-day operation of firms and have little 
incentive to monitor management. The reason is that monitoring management is a public good. Other shareholders 
can benefit from some shareholder monitoring management to improve performance. Given that some are free 
riders, others would not want to monitor management. Therefore, concentrated ownership of firms is necessary. 
However, large shareholders also create another agency problem between minority shareholders and major 
shareholders. Large shareholders that own less than 100% may underperform their monitoring role, as they cannot 
gain 100% profit from firms. Further, they may divert firm profit to themselves by selling goods at a lower price to 
firms they own. As mentioned before, this has been covered by Shleifer and Vishny and will not be explored further 
here.  
 
 In summary, more diversified holdings by a large number of shareholders may improve corporate 
governance in that the managers can align with the interest of shareholders (the alignment effect). In contrast, given 
more concentrated holding by fewer shareholders, it is more likely that managers will act contrarily to the interest of 
shareholders (entrenchment effects). Therefore, more diversified holdings are more likely to compel managers’ 
incentive to manage earnings.  
 
3.2.5 Institutional Shareholders 
 
 Institutional shareholders tend to be more informed than individual shareholders. They are generally able to 
spend more time researching the firm and its industry, whereas individual shareholders tend to have limited time to 
monitor firms’ performance. Further, the institutional shareholders, including holders of pension funds, investment 
trusts, and insurance companies, are more powerful: they invest large amounts of money into a firm and thus have 
greater incentive to monitor their interest in the firms. When the firm performs poorly, they can place pressure on the 
managers of the firm and even withdraw their investment. Hirschman (1970) finds that exit action by institutional 
shareholders exerts pressure on management. Thus, institutional shareholders can provide market power for 
corporate control.  
 
 The items mentioned above are the most common determinants of corporate governance used by 
researchers. However, some research would like to use a combined measurement to measure the degree of corporate 
governance. Mitton (2002) uses compose of various variables to provide a thorough measurement of corporate 
governance. These variables include disclosure quality, ownership concentration, and the corporate diversification 
level. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) have combined various determinants to create a governance index
40
, G-
                                                 
39 However, Hart (1995) argues that dispersed ownership of large public firms creates the problem that small holding 
shareholders are too small to exercise control over the day-to-day operation of firms and have little incentive to monitor 
management. The reason is that monitoring management is a public good. Other shareholders can benefit from some 
shareholder monitoring of management to improve performance. Given that some are free riders, others would not want to 
monitor management.  
40 G-Score includes Blank Check, Classified Board, Special Meeting, Written Consent, Compensation Plans, Contracts, 
Golden Parachutes, Indemnification, Cumulative Voting, Anti-Greenmail, Directors’ Duties, Poison Pill, and Directors’ 
Duties Law.  
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Score, to measure the overall extent of corporate governance of firms
41
. This combination measurement is relatively 
not common.  
 
4. TYPES OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
 Earnings management is the choice of a manager of accounting policies or other actions—including 
voluntary earnings forecasting, voluntary disclosure, and estimation of accruals—to affect earnings intentionally. 
Earnings management is an important research area, as earnings management may undermine the credibility of 
financial statements, which provide useful information for stakeholders in well-functioning capital markets. Most 
studies in the earnings management literature have focused on two types of general earnings management: accrual 
management and the manipulation of real economic activities. For discretionary accruals, a firm can use provisions 
for credit losses (Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas, 1999; Anandarajan., Hasan., and McCarthy, 2007), warranty costs 
(Cohen et al., 2011), inventory values, and the timing and amount of unusual items; however, the accrual earnings 
management may have a reverse effect (Dechow et al, 2012). Another type of earnings management is the use of 
real variables, which may be costly, to affect the firm’s long-term interest. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) 
find that most respondents would prefer to use real variables to manage earnings. Schipper (1989) claims that it is 
very costly to determine managers’ earnings management tactics. She argues that even more visible earnings 
management techniques, like change in accounting policies and timing of capitalization, are difficult to interpret.  
 
 Prior studies have explored the reasons for earnings management. One such reason is compensation 
schemes (Healy, 1985; McNichols and Wilson, 1988
42
; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995
43
; Gaver, Gaver, and 
Austin, 1995; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Houmes and Skantz, 2010). Healy 
(1985) provides the earliest evidence of contractual motivation to manage earnings. Since managers have inside 
information, they have opportunities to manage net income to maximize their bonuses. Therefore, it is more likely 
that managers will increase current-period earnings. According to Healy, most bonus schemes from his samples have 
a bogey but not have a cap. Further, he finds that for bonus schemes with a bogey and a cap, 46% are income-
increasing. Compensation induces managers to engage in earnings management; however, this is by no means 
consistent across countries (Brown and Higgins, 2001
44
). Recent studies have shown that top managers’ 
compensation is linked to firm performance, which is correlated to greater earnings management (Cornett, McNutt, 
and Tehranian, 2009; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2010). More importantly, managers may manage current earnings 
upward at the expense of future earnings in order to ensure job security (DeFond and Park, 1997). However, some 
prior studies provide evidence that changes in top management provide incentives for income-decreasing earnings 
management. New managers are more likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings management in order to take 
a “big bath”, therefore increasing their chances of earning a bonus in the subsequent period. 
 
 Another motivation is debt covenants. Usually, a long-term debt contract has covenants to protect 
debtholders. If firms violate debt covenants, they will face higher costs. Therefore, managers are more likely to 
manage earnings to avoid covenants. Sweeney (1995) finds that firms near default tended to adopt new accounting 
standards to increase earnings. Other papers also demonstrate consistent results (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1996; Shores, Bowen and DuCharme, 1995). Furthermore, firms are also more 
likely to avoid reporting losses by managing earnings. Otherwise, they could violate covenants and face higher costs 
(Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997b). More importantly, Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue the need for 
differentiating managers’ different opposing or reinforcing motives so as to identify the magnitude of each motive. 
For instance, managers may be motivated to overstate earnings as result of beating or meeting the analyst forecasts 
or because of compensation contracts as above mentioned.  
  
                                                 
41 Gompers et al. (2003) combine 24 different provisions to construct a governance index from 1,500 firms. 
42 They also document similar results to Healy’s findings. The difference is that McNichols and Wilson use bad debt 
allowance as a measure of earnings management. They argue that discretionary accrual exists when the difference estimate 
and actual bad debt provision.  
43 They study managers’ accruals behavior for bonus purposes, and their findings are consistent with Healy’s results.  
44 They find that as compared with firms in other countries, US firms are more likely to manage earnings to meet investors’ 
expectations.  
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 Firms that issue earnings forecasts are more likely to manage earnings to meet investors’ expectations 
(Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Kasznik, 1999; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999; Matsunaga and Park, 2001; 
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; Barton and Mercer, 2005; Das, Shroff, and Zhang, 2007; Chin, Chen, and Hsieh, 
2009). Some studies find that management appears to manage earnings to prevent earnings from falling below 
analysts’ forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Kasznik, 1999; Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). 
DeAngelo et al. (1996)
45
 document that when firms cannot consistently meet earnings growth forecasts, they 
experience, on average, 14% negative abnormal returns. More significantly, it is more likely that firms with losses or 
inconsistent earnings growth would be more incentivized to manipulate earnings, as they could gain more utility 
from management (prospect theory)
46
 and could also reduce transaction costs with stakeholders, as the terms of 
transactions tend to be more favorable for firms with higher or positive earnings
47
. Therefore, there is strong 
incentive for managers to manage earnings to meet investors’ expectations. McVay, Nagar, and Tang (2006) find that 
managers are more likely to manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts before selling their shares. Firms are also 
more likely to manage earnings to set better prices before listing. After initial public offering (IPO) dates, there are 
frequently reversals of earnings management (Hughes, 1986, Clarkson et al., 1992; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a, 
b). Cormier and Martinez (2006) provide evidence that firms in France with weak corporate governance that provide 
earnings forecasts have a greater earnings management after their IPOs. Further, when some firms acquiring other 
firms in which stock consideration is a part of purchase price, earnings are more likely to be managed upward to 
increase the share price and reduce the acquisition cost (Louis, 2004). Further, earnings management may occur 
because of loan loss reasons (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Beaver, McNichol, and Nelson, 2003). Additionally, some 
studies have shown that some firms use hedging activities to manage earnings (Barton, 2001) and some change 
research and development costs to manage earnings (Bushee, 1998).  
 
 As mentioned above, earnings management can be treated as opportunistic behavior. However, earnings 
management can also reduce blocked communication to reveal insider information and serve as a signaling 
mechanism (Lambert, 1984; Suh, 1990; Stocken and Verrecchia, 2004). These studies provide evidence that earnings 
management can be used as a signaling mechanism to improve blocked communication channels between insiders 
and outsiders. For instance, regarding earnings management in the banking industry, Beaver et al. (1989) and 
Wahlen (1994) find that the market reacts positively to incremental loan loss reserves (signaling effect rather than 
opportunistic effect)
48
. However, opportunistic earnings management is probably more common (Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney, 1996; Hanna, 1999).  
 
5. MEASURES OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
 Researchers have generally used four models to identify earnings management, including discretionary 
accruals. The most popular method is to decompose the total accruals into normal and abnormal groups; other 
models consider the earnings management components, discontinuities in earnings distribution (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997a, b), or account-specific items (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Petroni, 1992; Beatty et al., 1995; Haw, 
Ho, and Li, 2011). 
 
5.1 Discretionary Accruals 
 
 Accrual is used to mitigate the problem of timing and the matching problem; however, it can reflect 
management intentions. Investors can use the financial information for their decision making. The earnings are a 
specific focus of investors because the investors’ objective is to maximize their wealth. Usually, investors use 
                                                 
45 They estimate that 8–12% of firms with small earnings decreases manage earnings to avoid a decrease in earnings. 
Moreover, 30–44% of firms with small losses manage earnings to avoid a loss in that period.  
46 Please refer to Kahneman and Tversky, 1979. 
47 Bowen et al. (1995) further discuss how firms with higher earnings can reduce transaction costs with respect to customers, 
suppliers, lenders, and valuable employees. For instance, customers are willing to buy goods from firms with higher 
earnings because they can meet warranty guarantees. Suppliers and lenders can offer better contract terms to firms with 
higher earnings because they are less likely to default. Employees are more likely to be retained in firms with higher 
earnings. 
48 Beatty et al. (1995) also find that managers are more likely manage loan loss reserves with other earnings management 
techniques.  
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earnings to measure company performance and adjust their investment decisions based on the available information. 
However, managers can use accruals to manage earnings in order to meet or beat financial analysts’ expectations or 
other incentives.  
 
 Research regarding the use of accruals begins with Healy (1985). He uses working capital accrual as a 
measure of accruals. However, the Healy model does not incorporate determinants of nondiscretionary accruals. 
Therefore, earlier studies would use this model or have made minor changes to this model (DeAngelo, 1986), 
assuming the nondiscretionary accrual level to be constant. However, the assumption is not realistic, as 
nondiscretionary accrual should be changed following any change in business activities (Kaplan, 1985; McNichols, 
2000). McNichols (2000) provides some evidence that firm characteristics (e.g., high-expected-growth stocks) are 
correlated with discretionary accruals. She also shows evidence that the total accruals models does not include long-
term earnings growth, thereby it may thus have a misspecification problem (Dechow et al., 2012). This suggests that 
the change in accruals may relate to firm characteristics rather than incentive for earnings management.  
 
 Jones (1991) created a model to measure managers’ entrenchments after controlling firm’s normal accrual 
with changes in revenues and property, plants, and equipment. The 1991 Jones model is the most popular proxy for 
earnings management concerning abnormal accruals
49
. The normal accruals can be estimated and explained by the 
amount of accruals explained by changes in sales and property, plants, and equipment. As Jones states, revenues 
could be the main driver of current accruals, whereas property, plants, and equipment are the main driver of 
noncurrent accruals. Beaver (2002) claims that this model is too simple. After controlling these two variables, the 
remaining unexplained error terms are regarded as discretionary accruals, a measure of earnings management. 
However, this model can have difficulty accurately estimating nondiscretionary accruals. Given a failure in 
estimating the entire nondiscretionary accrual, the error term would include both nondiscretionary and discretionary 
accruals. The regression results would omit the correlated problem, such as firm size, especially in cross-section 
analysis research (Ecker et al., 2011), because firm size is more likely to affect the level of accrual parameters such 
as growth, complexity, and monitoring. The model was used until Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and Sloan 
(1996) modified Jones’ model by adjusting the determinants of change in revenue by determining the change in net 
accounts receivable so that credit sales would not be included in the determinants of nondiscretionary accruals, as 
the firm may manage credit sales. However, this adjusted model is not very powerful, especially in cases of extreme 
performance, because it most likely has a lower ability to isolate discretionary accruals (Dechow et al 2012). 
 
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) proposes another model to emigrate this problem. They use a different 
approach to estimate discretionary accruals: they include determinants of past, present, and future operating cash 
flow as nondiscretionary. Nondiscretionary accruals should be negatively correlated with present cash flow and 
positively correlated with future cash flow. However, this method is also questionable (Wysocki, 2009). 
Furthermore, Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) develop a performance-matched discretionary model to measure 
earnings management by using return on assets and industry to control the effect on the discretionary accruals. 
However, Dechow et al. (2012) also argue that this model can reduce the misspecification problem, but it reduces 
the test power of the model.  
 
 Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) argue that there are likely to have inference problems by using existing 
accruals models, and McNichols (2000) argues that this model cannot support by theory in the absence of discretion 
to change in behavior of accruals, so she recommends combining the Jones model and the Dechow and Dichev 
model (McNichols, 2002). Dechow et al. (2012) argue that the above models are tests of low power for earnings 
management of economically plausible magnetite, which account only for 1–5% of total assets; when firms have 
extreme financial performance, the above models have misspecification problems. Therefore, they introduce an 
approach to detect earnings management and to improve test power with the migrating misspecification problem as 
using accruals as earnings management in one period must reverse in another period. Nondiscretionary accruals 
should persist across periods as a firm’s going concern. Therefore, this model can test the reversal level of 
                                                 
49 Jones used this model to test whether firms would gain benefits from import relief, including tax tariff increases and quota 
reductions, and found that firms would attempt to manage earnings during import relief investigations.  
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discretionary accrual while persisting in nondiscretionary accrual
50
 to improve the detection power of earnings 
management. They also test the new approach with Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) study of IPOs and Defond and 
Jiambalvo’s (1994) study of debt covenant violations. Their results show significant improvement of the test power 
of earnings management. One difference between the 1991 Jones model and the 2012 Dechow model are dependent 
variable replacement from total accrual to working capital estimated by change in current assets deducing by 
changes in current liabilities and cash and adding by change in short term debts (Dechow et al., 2012). Independent 
variables include variables to estimate the earnings management reversal with determinants of nondiscretionary 
accruals and also dropping depreciation variable, as it is related to long-term capital expenditure rather than working 
capital (Allen, Larson, and Sloan, 2010). 
 
 As Dechow et al. (2012) state, the explanation power of accrual-based models for earnings management is 
low, and because of omitted correlated variables for nondiscretionary accruals, the model test has many 
misspecification problems. They suggest that the choice of models depends on specific research: if researchers are 
concerned with the reversal of earnings management, then they can use the new Dechow model. In addition, when 
using Jones and modified Jones models, a concern is the problem of incorrectly classifying discretionary accruals as 
non-discretionary unless omitted variables bias can be eliminated. The determinants of nondiscretionary accruals 
should be chosen based on economic conditions to see whether they would be correlated with earnings management. 
When using the Dechow and Dichev performance-matching model, they advise caution unless the omitted correlated 
variables are known. 
 
5.2 Assets Turnover (ATO)/Profits Margin (PM) Diagnostic 
 
 Over the last twenty years, many researchers have used the Jones model (1991) or other accrual models as a 
proxy for earnings management. In addition to Dechow’s (2012) new model, a recent paper demonstrates a new 
insight for the proxy of earnings management that uses asset turnover and a profit margin diagnostic. This model is 
to decompose DuPont analysis into asset turnover and profit margin. Jansen, Ramnath, and Yohn (2012)
51
 observe 
that the changes in ATO or PM warrant further investigation in quality of earnings analyses. They also note that 
changes in both ATO and PM could signal earnings management. As upward earnings management can affect both 
the income statement and balance sheet in the same direction; However, it can also affect operating income and net 
operating assets in opposite directions, which can signal downward earnings management. In theory, an increase in 
profit margin (e.g., by understating R&D, bad debt, or other expenses) and a decrease in asset turnover can signal 
upward earnings management, whereas, a decrease in profit margin (e.g., by overstating expenses) and an increase 
in asset turnover can signal downward earnings management. For instance, if a firm manages earnings by 
understating allowances for doubtful debts, it can overstate the profit margin ratio, thereby overstating net accounts 
receivable and understating the asset turnover ratio, or vice versa. They test whether this new measure can meet or 
beat analyst forecasts, whether it can explain the subsequent earnings restatements as an indicator of earnings 
management, and whether it can explain the earnings reversals and future abnormalities. For the first test, even 
though the diagnostic already controls for abnormal and discretionary accruals, the diagnostic can still provide 
additional information that a firm meets or beats expectations and has a greater discriminating ability to identify 
firms that are beating or meeting analyst forecasts than the accrual model. For the second test, the diagnostic can 
provide additional information about a firm’s likelihood of managing earnings downward by “taking a bath” or 
“smoothing income”. For the third test, abnormal accruals cannot explain future earnings restatements, whereas the 
diagnostic can provide additional information about a firm’s likelihood of restating earnings in the future. For the 
fourth test, both the abnormal and diagnostic accruals are useful for identifying earnings reversals. Hence, future EM 
research may be better to include this additional diagnostic to testify the relationship of variables. Otherwise, the 
explanatory power for accrual model seems to be not strong enough.  
 
  
                                                 
50 In that paper, Dechow et al. (2012) added two variables to the previous model, including a dummy variable in which 
earnings management is hypothesized to reverse and another to classify the period of earnings management.   
51 They test an ATO and PM diagnostic with abnormal accruals to determine whether it can provide incremental information to 
identify earnings management and whether opposite change in PM and ATO can signal earnings management.  
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5.3 Earnings Management Proxies: Classification Shifting 
 
 Most previous studies of earnings management have focused on accrual management and manipulation of 
real economic activities. However, some researches are more willing to use proxies to measure the existing earnings 
management. For instance, a recent paper has provided a proxy: measuring earnings management by classification 
shifting—managers’ deliberate misclassification of core expenses as noncore special items on the statement of 
comprehensive income to create the illusion of an increase in core earnings for investors (Haw et al., 2011) so as to 
affect the share performance. They find that like other measures of earnings management, one of the motivations to 
shift core expenses to special items is to meet analyst earnings forecasts (McVay et al., 2006). The difference 
between the Haw and McVay research is that the former uses two corporate governance measures including 
ownership structure and type of auditors, and legal institutions.  
 
5.4 Earnings Management Proxies: Restatements 
 
 One of indicators of whether firms engage in earnings management is the existence of restatements and 
fraud in financial information. The restatements of financial information can be classified into non-intentional errors 
and intentional irregularities based on the US SEC, lawyers, and auditors (Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008). 
Hennes et al. find the overall market reaction on restatement to be negative; however, market response to intentional 
irregularities is much stronger. Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) indicate that CEOs and CFOs who file material 
restatements are more likely to leave firms. The majority of directors and audit committee members leave firms 
when there are restatements, and they suffer reputation penalties (Srinivasan, 2005). 
 
6. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
6.1 External Corporate Governance 
 
6.1.1 The Legal System and Earnings Management 
 
 The protection of outsider investors is a function of both the rights accorded to them and the legal 
enforcement of these rights. The extent of earnings management is correlated to the institutional arrangements of 
countries. Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) provided evidence that countries with stronger legal systems have 
lower earnings management. Countries with lower investor protection usually have a higher magnitude of earnings 
management (Leuz, Nanada, and Wysocki, 2003
52
), and this lack of protection gives insiders more incentive to 
obfuscate firm performance. Leuz et al. (2003) classify sample countries into three clusters
53
 that are similar to prior 
studies that group countries according to common or code law (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin, and 
Wu, 2003). They find that earnings management scores among the three clusters are significant and that countries 
with lower earnings management are correlated with strong investor legal protection. Prior studies demonstrate that 
it is less likely for managers to divert earnings or assets when there is greater legal protection (Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon, 2002; Nenova, 2003). Some recent studies have also provided consistent evidence. Chin et al. (2009) 
find that foreign-owned firms in Taiwan with stronger levels of investor protection have reduced earnings 
management to meet the target level of earnings from outsiders. Ball et al. (2003) argue that the institutional 
arrangements of a country is the most important factor in controlling managers’ self-interest, reducing opportunistic 
earnings management, and improving the quality of financial reporting. However, another view suggests that even 
countries under common law, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, report earnings that do not show 
common law prosperities (Ball et al., 2003). Fan and Wong (2002) present consistent findings. Prior studies find that 
severe earnings management and a low level of earnings informativeness are the characteristics of weak investor 
protection institutions (DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant, 2007; Leuz et al., 2003).  
                                                 
52 They compare 31 countries with different levels of legal protection and find that around the world, earnings management 
measures are negatively associated with the quality of minority shareholder rights and legal enforcement.  
53 The first cluster includes Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the UK, Norway, Canada, Australia, and the USA; the second 
includes Austria, Taiwan, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, France, Finland, Sweden, South 
Africa, and Ireland; the third includes Greece, Korea, Portugal, Italy, India, Spain, Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines. 
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6.1.2 Effects of Takeover and Earnings Management 
 
 When firms face a higher probability of being acquired or losing control, they have more incentive to 
engage in practices to reduce this likelihood (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Billet and Xue, 2007), and are more 
likely to repurchase their own stocks. Similarly, such firms are also more likely to manage earnings to show better 
performance as a takeover defense, inflating the share price and raising the cost to acquirers and making it more 
difficult for acquirers to complete the deal. Perry and Williams (1994) and Wu (1997) provide evidence that under 
management buyout, firms are more likely to manage earnings downward so that managers can purchase firm shares 
at a lower price. In contrast, Braga-Alves et al. (2009)
54
 document that firms would manage earnings upward to 
reduce or avoid the likelihood of a successful takeover. Thus, it is more likely that firms would use more 
conservative accounting policies to reduce their takeover risk (Shen, 2007).  
 
6.2 Internal Corporate Governance 
 
6.2.1 Ownership Structure and Earnings Management 
 
 Corporate governance structure and earnings management are correlated with earnings informativeness and 
earnings quality. Prior studies have documented that ownership structure can influence firm earnings quality 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan, 2007). Firms with higher dispersed ownership can reduce 
earnings management because no majority can control the operation of firms, insiders cannot enjoy private benefits 
from controlling firms
55
, and their interests can align with other owners. Firms must meet public expectations in 
terms of disclosure and improved earnings quality. Leuz et al. (2003) indicate that earnings management appears to 
be lower in firms with dispersed ownership, which can reduce insiders’ incentive to conceal firm performance 
(Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) provide recent evidence that a 
lower level of insider ownership is associated with less earnings management, which is consistent with previous 
studies. In contrast, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) indicates an entrenchment effect with concentrated 
ownership. In such cases, managers are more likely to manipulate earnings to cover their entrenchment behavior. 
These firms are under ineffective corporate governance mechanisms, including the boards of directors, the 
composition of boards, and external capital market control over the firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 
1999; Johnson et al., 2000b).  
 
 Jiraporn and DaDalt (2009) show that founding-family-owned firms have less incentive to manage 
earnings, as they do not have high pressure to meet or beat earnings expectations. Wang (2006) also provides 
evidence consistent with prior studies. Fan and Wong (2002) provide evidence that East Asian earnings 
informativeness measured by earnings return relation is related to ownership structure. Fan and Wong measured 
different types of ownership structures, including concentrated-level, associated-pyramidal, and cross-holding 
structures. Major shareholders have a conflict of interest with minority shareholders, as they are more likely to 
prevent disclosure of proprietary information to the minority or the public, and are also likely to manipulate the 
reporting of earnings to cover self-interest behavior. The problems of lower earnings quality, more earnings 
management, and less informativeness are not because of poor accounting standards; in fact, many East Asian 
countries have already imposed international accounting standards or have complied with international accounting 
standards to make some changes. Rather, these problems are largely due to poor corporate structure, one of the 
elements of corporate governance.  
 
6.2.2 Composition of Boards and Earnings Management 
 
 Board governance can effectively influence managers’ operation, investment, and finance decisions and 
activities, and can influence choosing, hiring, and controlling the external auditors and internal control mechanisms 
                                                 
54 They find that the possibility of takeover and earnings management does not exist for firms with market capitalization over 
US $10 billion. They argue that it is easier to detect earnings management in stronger informational environments. Another 
reason is that the cost of compliance with higher standard corporate governance is smaller for larger firms, and financial 
analysts are more likely to follow larger firms (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2005; O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990). Therefore, it is 
relatively more difficult to manage earnings.   
55 Leuz et al. (2003) find that higher private control benefit is significantly and positively correlated with aggregate earnings 
management measures (p. 32).  
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via the audit committee. In turn, better board governance can use the internal control system to control opportunistic 
earnings management (Byrd and Hickman, 1992
56
; Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994; Klein, 2002; Carcello et al., 
2006). 
 
Board Independence and Earnings management 
 
 Prior studies have documented how board independence can reduce earnings management (Jensen and 
Fama, 1983; Dechow and Dichev, 2002
57
; Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2000) because independent directors do not 
pursue self-interests such as executive compensation and the misappropriation of assets, pressure from shareholders 
to meet or beat expectations of firm performance, and the need to maintain personal reputation to the public. 
Williamson (1981) argues that the independence of the board is needed to control managerial activities to protect the 
interest of investors. Board independence can also prevent managers’ abuse of power and to dampen investors’ 
interest (Roe, 1991). More importantly, shareholders can control the appointment and reappointment of independent 
directors. Therefore, it gives pressure to them to well monitor management closely. Dechow et al. (1996) argue that 
firms with extensive earnings management are more likely controlled by insiders rather than outsiders. Beasley 
(1996) finds that the inclusion of a large numbers of outside directors on the board can reduce the likelihood of 
financial information fraud. When the CEO comes from the founding family, the firm tends to lack independence 
and have a higher probability of restatement of accounting information (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). Peasnell, Pope, 
and Young (2005) find that a higher proportion of outside directors in the UK can better constrain income-increasing 
discretionary accruals to avoid earnings management. Klein (2002) finds support for the negative relationship 
between board independence and earnings management in the US. Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004) also find 
evidence consistent with prior studies in the US. Sharma (2004) finds evidence that Australian firms with greater 
board independence and intuitional ownership have less fraud than those with CEO duality. Xie, Davidson III, and 
DaDalt (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2000) indicate relationships between board independence and the extent of 
earnings management: Xie et al. (2003) document a negative relationship; Peasnell et al. (2000) find an increased 
likelihood of discretionary accrual to avoid earnings loss for firms with higher proportions of non-executive 
directors. Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, and Kent (2005) provide evidence consistent with these findings: Australian 
firms with higher board independence have more incentive to manage earnings. Most of these studies consider 
earnings management according to discretionary accruals. However, the effectiveness of this model is questionable, 
as it has a very low power to infer the relationships between the independent and dependent variables and because of 
omitted correlated variables for nondiscretionary accruals, the test of the model has misspecifications. Given the 
latest findings from the Jansen PM/ATO diagnostic, future studies related to earnings management may need to 
consider this model to improve the explanatory power of the test. 
 
Female Representation on Boards and Earnings Management 
 
 Some prior studies investigate the relationships between the proportion of female directors on boards with 
earnings management and earnings quality. Adams and Ferreira (2009) claim that female directors are more likely to 
have board diligence and more effort to demand and monitor for managers’ performance. Further, female directors 
think more independently and monitor CEO behavior more effectively than male directors (Carter, Simkins, and 
Simpson, 2003
58
). Adams et al. (2010) also argue that female directors are more likely to think independently and 
monitor executives more effectively. This is a very critical control for earnings management: firms with more 
females on the board can have better earnings quality and lower earnings management because independent thinking 
is critical for checking opportunistic activities and providing better quality financial information. 
 
                                                 
56 Using the market reaction to the adoption of poison pills, they consider whether firms controlled by outside directors can 
align their interest with that of shareholders or whether they harm shareholders. If the outside directors harm shareholders, 
there is no significant difference in market reaction to firms controlled by outside directors and those not. They find that 
outside directors are a vital part of board composition to control managers’ behavior and align with shareholders’ interest.  
57 The research finds that independent corporate boards can effectively monitor earnings management in firms operating in 
countries in the institutional arrangement of the US and the UK. 
58 They show that female directors have greater independence than their male counterparts.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2013 Volume 29, Number 2 
2013 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  407 
 Further, female directors are more likely to be less tolerant of opportunistic activities and behavior than 
male directors (Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Thorne, Massey, and Magnan, 2003
59
). Many prior studies in Canada 
and the US provide evidence that female auditors generally have higher levels of moral reasoning than their male 
counterparts (Etherington and Schulting, 1995; Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Lampe and Finn, 1992; Shaub, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1995). Another paper more directly investigates the relationship between female auditors and their level of 
tolerance of opportunistic behavior (Thorne et al., 2003) and finds that female auditors are less tolerant of 
misappropriation behavior than male auditors.  
 
 According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), an organization should reflect top executives and characteristics 
of top management teams and they argue that executive decision making is based on their experiences, values, and 
deposition. Thus, executives can influence firm performance through decision making in top management teams. 
The dynamics and complementarities of the management team greatly influence corporate outcomes and corporate 
governance (Hambrick, Nadler, and Tushman, 1998). Klenke (2002) proposes that the desires of female leaders and 
their efforts can build a culture of trust within firms using transformational strategies such as visioning, impression 
management for the organizational and individual good, and empowering team members. Hence, female leaders are 
more likely to employ a trust leadership style (Klenke, 2003
60
; Trinidad and Normore, 2005)
61
. This trust leadership 
requires managers to share more information with female directors. Powell and Ansic (1997) and Sunden and 
Surette (1998)
62
 find that females are more risk averse in their decision making than males. Therefore, Bajtelsmit 
and VanDerhei, (1997) and Hinz et al. (1997) argue that female directors are similarly risk averse in their decision 
making. Female directors should thus not allow management to manage earnings, causing them to face ligation risk 
and influencing their reputation. Earnings management would damage the reputation of firms (Hunto, Libby, and 
Mazza 2006
63
). DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004) find that during initial offerings of stock to the public, 
firms face more frequent lawsuits if there is earnings management. Hence, female directors are more averse to the 
risk of litigation and reputation loss (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Thus, female directors would choose and monitor internal 
and external auditors more closely.  
 
 Srinidhi et al. (2011) argue that female directors can improve board governance in terms of monitoring 
CEOs, improving board attendance, and improving communication; these aspects are likely to improve earnings 
quality. Therefore, female representation on the board can actually reduce earnings management for various reasons. 
Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui apply different measures of earnings management and find a positive relationship between 
female representation on the board and earnings management
64
. They test whether the proportions of female 
directors, female non-executive directors, and female audit committee members are correlated with opportunistic 
earnings management and find a significantly positive correlation.  
 
Audit Committee and Earnings Management 
 
 The audit committee fills various roles for the firm, management, shareholders, creditors, and other 
stakeholders. One of these roles is to enhance the credible financial statements used by stakeholders for their 
                                                 
59 This paper investigates whether the national institutional context is associated with differences in auditors’ moral reasoning 
by examining three components of auditors’ moral decision processes. One of the control variables for moral reasoning is 
gender.  
60 This paper investigates how gender difference can influence the decision-making process in top management teams.  
61 Other studies related to gender differences in the decision-making process include Powell (1990), Powell and Ansic (1997), 
and Carter, Williams, and Reynolds (1997). 
62 Sunden and Surette (1998) use data from the 1992 and 1995 Surveys of Consumer Finances to compare the distinguishing 
characteristics of investing in defined contribution plans by males and females. They find that gender significantly affects 
the allocation of assets in defined contribution plans.  
63 They find that earnings management in firms with high transparency damages the reputation of financial reporting, whereas 
earnings management in firms with low transparency does not affect the reputation of firms. The authors suggest that greater 
transparency can reduce earnings management.  
64 They apply earnings management measures, including the 2002 McNichols model, which combines the Dechow and Dichev 
model and earnings management by including changes in sales and property, plants, and equipment with operating cash flow 
in past, present, and future periods. They also use the 2003 Ashbaugh et al. model for their regression. They find a negative 
coefficient for the relationship, which indicates less opportunistic earnings management.  
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decision making. Agency theory comes into play when there is a separation of ownership and management. In such 
cases, management may not align with the interest of shareholders; this may result in the misappropriation of assets. 
Managers are likely to cover their opportunistic behavior by managing earnings. Thus, the audit committee can 
actively monitor the quality of work done by internal auditors and can choose better external auditors to improve the 
quality of financial statements. Another role of the committee is to maintain internal control effectiveness under the 
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Maintaining good internal control effectiveness can reduce earnings 
management and improve financial information. Song and Windram (2004)
65
 argue that limitations on the audit 
committee’s ability can affect its monitoring of financial accounting quality. Thus, audit committee structure is an 
important corporate governance mechanism.  
 
 As mentioned in section 3, the US, the UK and HK stock exchanges require certain proportion of 
independent non-executive directors who are not managers in audit committee so that they can provide a clear 
mandate for overseeing for financial statements and the work of external auditors. Chtourou, Bedard and Courteau 
(2001) provide firms with large proportion of outside directors in the committee have less income increasing 
earnings management. Further, they also find that the increase in proportion of short term stock options held by 
directors in audit committee is more likely to reduce the effectiveness of monitoring managers to have high level of 
earnings management.  
 
 Prior studies demonstrate that audit expertise can control fraud and earnings restatements, which are 
measures that affect earnings management (Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). Carcello 
et al. (2006)
66
 indicate a high correlation between the composition of the audit committee and earnings management. 
Further, for firms with other weak corporate governance mechanisms, both accounting and financial expertise can 
mitigate earnings management
67
. They also find that the most effective composition of the audit committee to 
control opportunistic earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals) includes independent audit 
directors with accounting or financial expertise. Carcello et al. (2006) document a trade-off between financial 
expertise (by the restricted definition) and other corporate governance mechanisms. Although audit committee 
financial expertise cannot provide an incremental effect on the reduction of earnings management, it can have an 
influential effect on firms with other poor corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, Hong Kong and UK SECs 
impose the requirement that an audit committee must include at least one financial expert. Another US study finds 
that audit committees with financial expertise can reduce earnings management (Bedard et al., 2004). Prior studies 
also demonstrate that audit committee independence can reduce opportunistic earnings manipulation (Turner and 
Vann, 2010). However, prior studies cannot show a relationship between the size of the audit committee and 
earnings management (Bedard et al., 2004). Cohen et al. (2005) find that after imposing SOX, earnings management 
drops significantly. This explains why the US government imposed harsh legal requirements on firms, including the 
audit committees, to maintain internal control effectiveness.  
 
Compensation Committee and Earnings Management 
 
 Section 5 details the incentives to manage earnings, one of which is compensation motivation. Managers 
are more likely to boost earnings, to earn higher bonuses, by reducing discretionary expenditure such as R&D or by 
adjusting discretionary accruals. The main function of the compensation committee is to design incentive plans for 
top managers. The committee can sometimes exercise its power for special situations in order to achieve this goal 
(Dechow, Huson, and Sloan, 1994). Hence, stock exchanges in US, UK, and elsewhere require listed firms to 
include a certain proportion of independent directors on a compensation committee to control managers’ self-
interest, such as overpaying themselves and reducing R&D expenditures (Cheng, 2004
68
). However, Cheng (2004) 
                                                 
65 They examine cases of firms subject to investigation by the Financial Reporting Review Panel. If there are busy directors 
and directors that hold shares of these firms, the audit committee’s ability to monitor earning quality tends to be limited. 
66 Carcello et al. (2006) did not find that the presence of an audit committee financial expert is associated with real earnings 
management. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005) indicate incremental real earnings management even after imposing SOX.   
67 They find that independent financial accounting expertise and non-accounting financial expertise are more effective at 
reducing earnings management.  
68 Cheng finds a significant relationship between change in R&D expenditures and change in value of CEO stock option 
grants. This explains why compensation committees can mitigate managerial opportunistic reductions in R&D expenditure 
through stock option payments.  
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only focuses on one real earnings management variable, namely R&D expenditure, and only considers eight 
industries. Therefore, results are based on only a few intensive industries. Prior studies do not suggest a relationship 
between stock option payments and earnings management (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Coles, Hertzel, and 
Kalpathy, 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; McAnally, Srivastava, and Weaver, 2008; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 
2008; Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008
69
). Huson et al (2012) provide evidence that the compensation 
committee makes decisions regarding discretionary expenditure in the executive’s terminal year when setting cash 
compensation for executives, and intervenes to reduce payments when managers make up accruals
70
. However, 
Pourciau (1993) argues that the members of the board of directors and shareholders have difficulty structuring the 
CEO turnover to reduce the opportunistic earnings management in the terminal year as the non-routine executive 
change is more likely unplanned and unexpected. Her result does not support her argument. Hence, these findings 
provide evidence to support the hypothesis that a well-functioning committee governance mechanism (such as a 
compensation committee) can identify opportunistic earnings management and pricing in the executive 
compensation setting.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
 Corporate governance can reduce or even eliminate the extent of earnings management. Normally, an 
institutional environment that provides better legal protection can control managers’ self-interest to a certain extent. 
Takeover force can put market pressure on managers to do the best for shareholders. Prior studies have investigated 
different corporate governance mechanisms that can have negative relationships with earnings management. Board 
independence can enhance certain monitoring behaviors in managers, including the misappropriation of assets. 
Female directors can develop trust leadership, which requires managers to share information, and are more likely to 
be risk averse to frauds and opportunistic earnings management. Audit committees can oversee internal control for 
financial reporting and the quality of financial information. Directors with financial expertise can provide 
incremental control effects on earnings management, especially firms with weak corporate governance. This paper 
reviews corporate governance systems, internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, earnings 
management, and earnings management measurements, as well as the relationships among them. Therefore, this 
paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by investigating these different mechanisms in detail, 
reviewing the latest findings on classification shifting and summarizing earnings management measures, including a 
new diagnostic system. Future research may need to investigate the new diagnostic system as well as the new model 
proposed by Dechow in different contexts. 
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